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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE
WINSTON HARRINGTON*

The Endangered Species Act' adopted by Congress in 1973, was
the nation's first comprehensive endangered species protection program. This act's most noteworthy feature was its recognition that
conventional economic activity, by affecting habitat, could pose at
least as much a danger to the extinction of species as could direct
predation. Section 7 of the new act provided a way to stop a great
many projects which threatened endangered species, regardless of
their social or economic benefits. While environmentalists hailed the
measure, others viewed it with alarm. Their fears were well expressed
by Senator Jake Garn of Utah: "[TI here are enough obscure species
of plants and animals to guarantee that nothing at all will happen in
this country if no endangered species is ever to be disturbed in its
comer of the environment." 2
In 1978, the act was amended, largely in response to the Tellico
Dam controversy, to provide some balance between these two viewpoints.3 These amendments instituted a procedure whereby nonenvironmental objectives could be weighed against the goal of endangered species protection.
*Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the American Water Resources Convention, Las Vegas, Nevada, September
1979. The author is indebted to David Abbey, Edith Brashares, William F. Hyde, and Walter
Spofford for their comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. 16 U.S.C. § § 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The first federal action concerning the general problem of extinction of wildlife was the Endangered Species Preservation
Act of 1966 Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, which called upon the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with wildlife experts, to publish a list of species threatened with extinction and appropriated funds for the acquisition of lands upon which these species would be
protected. Extension to foreign species was made by the Endangered Species Conservation
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973), which authorized the listing
of foreign species and prohibited their importation into the United States except under certain circumstances. For an extensive discussion of this and other federal legislation affecting
wildlife see M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977).
2. Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 2899 Before the
Subcomm on Resource Protectionof the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Pub. No. 96-159
93 Stat. 1225 (1979). Section 7 was the most important, though not the only, source of dissatisfaction with the 1973 act. Lachenmeier, The EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973: Preservation or Pandemonium?, 5 ENVT'L LAW 29 (1974).
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The purpose of this article is to examine this search for balance.
Specifically, to what extent was the implementation of the 1973 act
posing an actual versus a potential threat to economic development?
What was the nature of the economic objectives sacrificed? Finally,
how did the 1978 amendments affect endangered species protection
and economic development?
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973
This act modified previous endangered species protection legislation in several significant ways. First, regulatory authority was given
to the Secretary of Interior for preservation of endangered species
within the United States. It became unlawful to "take" (kill, capture,
or hurt) an individual member of an endangered species.' Thus, direct actions against endangered species were prohibited.
Second, the act established formal categories for endangered and
threatened species together with criteria for inclusion on a list of endangered and threatened species. Although species listed as threatened with extinction pursuant to the 1966 and 1969 acts were automatically made members of this list, additions to it could only be
made through informal rulemaking procedures.'
Third, for the first time the indirect effects of economic activity
on endangered species' survival could be regulated. Section 7 authorized the Secretary of Interior to designate, as appropriate, areas of
critical habitat for particular species. In addition, all federal departments were required to ensure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them did not jeopardize the continued existence of
endangered species or modify their critical habitat. Furthermore,
they were to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) whenever there was a possibility that an endangered species would be
affected. 6
A fourth innovation in the 1973 act was a citizen suit provision,
which permitted any person to file a civil suit against the United7
States and any of its agencies to enjoin them from violating the act.
The Importance of Section 7. Its Effect on Economic Development
Section 7 soon emerged as the most effective and controversial
feature of the 1973 act, because it permitted the regulation of vir4. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1976).
5. The rules of most federal agencies are promulgated by informal (also called noticeand-comment) rulemaking, as specified in Section 5 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5

U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE
L.J. 38 (1975).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1976).
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tually all activities having possible impacts on endangered species. Although only federal action was regulated, this limitation was not
restrictive, inasmuch as economic development having even modest
environmental impact already required a federal permit of some kind,
especially in the West.
Also, while Section 7 did not contemplate direct intervention by
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the procedure that emerged allowed extensive opportunities for the regulation of projects. Other federal
agencies had direct responsibility and regulatory authority to protect
endangered species jeopardized by activities performed, funded, or
otherwise permitted by them. The Fish and Wildlife Service's authority came from the consultation requirement, which resulted in a biological opinion issued by FWS on effects of the action on endangered
wildlife. If the biological opinion found the action would jeopardize
species' survival, then the action would have to be cancelled or appropriately modified.'
The potential effects of Section 7 on development were especially
important in areas which had been designated as critical habitat for
particular species. In such areas, FWS could issue an unfavorable biological opinion upon a showing that habitat would be altered. There
was no need to show that the species' existence was jeopardized.
It is useful to compare Section 7 to Section 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act,9 with which it has certain procedural
resemblances. NEPA makes environmental quality an objective of
national policy. In particular, Section 102 states that federal programs give environmental objectives "appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations."
To that end, Section 102(C) requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) for most federal actions that may
affect environmental quality. Similarly, the Endangered Species Act
requires that federal agencies report the effects of their actions on
endangered species (in fact, this determination is usually made as part
of an EIS) and if necessary, that they consult FWS.
However, Section 7 goes far beyond a requirement that agencies
give appropriate consideration to effects of their actions on endangered species (presumably required by NEPA anyway). If the consultation determines that a proposed agency action poses a threat to the
survival of an endangered species or its critical habitat, then the proj8. Although the possibility of balancing endangered species protection with other objectives had been allowed by the eighth circuit court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289
(1976), this position was later rejected by the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978). See Stromberg, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Is the Statute Itself Endangered?, 6 ENVT'L AFF. 511 (1978).
9. P.L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976)).
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ect must be altered or cancelled in order to remove that threat. In
other words, rather than balance endangered species considerations
with other considerations, the act requires that adverse impacts on
endangered species be avoided regardless of other objectives.
For development projects, the consultation process thus raises the
possibility of costly alterations or substantial delays. Regulations
promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service require that "[u]ntil consultation has been completed and a biological opinion has been issued, good faith consultation shall preclude a Federal agency from making an irreversible or
irretrievable commitment of resources which would foreclose the
consideration of modifications or alternatives to the identified activity or program." 1 0
This regulation could stop work on a project by imposing lengthy
delays while biological studies are completed to determine negative
impact on endangered species or critical habitat. In one case, for example, FWS at first estimated that three years would be required to
conduct the studies necessary to render the biological opinion.' 1
Although these regulations are applicable only to listed species,
fears have been expressed that the Endangered Species Act provides a
"hunting license" for environmental groups who could stop any project by discovering some obscure species or subspecies in the affected
area. Environmental groups could intervene both through the citizen
suit provision and through FWS regulations whereby any person may
petition for the review of the status of any species.1 2 If, as a result of
this petition, the species is listed, the project becomes subject to the
act, and a consultation process must be initiated. The possibility of
intervention thus creates considerable uncertainty for proposed projects.
As a result, Section 7 can have a severe impact on economic development. Has this potential been realized? What in fact have been the
impacts of the act on economic development? A thorough answer to
this question is beyond the scope of this paper, inasmuch as the Fish
and Wildlife Service has been involved in about 20,000 consultations
with other federal agencies. However, a preliminary examination suggests that in only a handful of cases has the act led to irresolvable
conflicts between economic development and endangered species
10. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (1979).
11. This estimate was made by the Denver Regional Office of the Fish and Wildlife Service in the biological opinion submitted to the Omaha District of the Corps of Engineers,
December 15, 1977, on the effects of Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir on the survival of the
whooping crane.
12. 50C.F.R. § 17.13 (1979).
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protection. We turn now to a brief overview of several cases to see
how such conflicts have been resolved.
Litigation to Protect Endangered Species
1. Devil's Hole pupfish. In United States v. Cappaert,' ' the United
States brought suit for a declaration of its rights to the waters necessary to maintain the habitat of the Devil's Hole pupfish and a permanent injunction against a nearby rancher to prevent pumping that
would lower the water level in Devil's Hole. The injunction was
granted.
2. Mississippi sandhill crane. In National Wildlife Federation v.
Coleman, 4 NWF brought an action to halt construction of a six-mile
segment of Interstate Highway 10 (1-10), which would have disrupted
the habitat of the Mississippi sandhill crane, a subspecies consisting of
only 40 individuals. The court of appeals found that the defendants
had failed to ensure their actions would not adversely affect the
crane's habitat and granted an injunction preventing further construction. The highway was completed after the defendants made changes
suggested by the Fish and Wildlife Service.
3. Indiana bat. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,' s an injunction was
sought to prevent construction of the Maramec Park Lake Dam in
Missouri, which would flood caves inhabited by the Indiana bat. The
appeals court refused to grant the injunction on the basis that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the existence of the Indiana bat
would be jeopardized.
4. Snail darter. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against completion
of TVA's Tellico Dam in Tennessee on the grounds that it would cause
extinction of the snail darter by flooding its habitat in the Little Tennessee River, the only place where snail darters were known to exist.
The United States Supreme Court ruled in TVA v. Hill' 6 that protection afforded endangered species by Section 7 was absolute (TVA had
argued that congressional appropriation of funds for the completion
of the project after the listing of the snail darter was evidence of congressional intent). The furor that arose after the injunction was
granted precipitated the 1978 Amendments to the act, which specified
that the Tellico project be reviewed by a cabinet-level panel for pos13. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). Although the Endangered Species Act was involved in this
case because of the threat to the endangered pupfish, the principal legal issue concerned the
extension of the doctrine of federal reserved water rights to groundwater and also to in situ
use of water. C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, WATER RIGHTS AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE YELLOWSTONE RIVER 34 (1980).
14. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976).
15. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
16. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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sible exemption. This panel found estimated benefits from completion of the dam did not justify the cost of finishing it and failed to
grant an exemption. Subsequently, Congress specifically exempted
the Tellico project from the Endangered Species Act. 1
5. Furbish lousewort. This variety of snapdragon, long thought to
be extinct, was rediscovered by the U.S. Corps of Engineers during
preparation of the draft EIS on the Dickey-Lincoln project, a planned
hydroelectric facility on the St. Johns River in northern Maine.1 8 A
compromise was worked out in which only some of the affected area
would be flooded, but the House Public Works and Transportation
Committee subsequently withdrew its support for the project, making
completion unlikely.' 1
6. Woundfin. Construction of the Warner Valley Dam could decrease the flow in the Virgin River in southwestern Utah, and thereby
threaten existence of the woundfin, an endangered minnow found
only in the Virgin River. Water stored behind the dam would be used
to supply a 500-megawatt power plant and to meet the needs of the
city of St. George, Utah. This project is now on "hold" pending further investigation by the FWS of actual instream flow requirements
of the woundfin. 2 0
7. Whooping crane. In Nebraska v. Ray, 2 an injunction was
granted to prevent completion of Grayrocks Dam in eastern Wyoming, partly because of effects of increased water consumption by a
power plant on the whooping crane habitat in the Platte River channel 300 miles downstream. A compromise was reached in which the
power companies created a trust fund for purchasing downstream
water rights to replace water used by the plant.
8. Colorado squawfish. The Colorado River Water Conservation
District has applied for a permit from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to construct Juniper Dam on the Yampa River in northwest Colorado. In preliminary discussions, FWS disclosed that the dam
would inundate an area inhabited by the Colorado squawfish and that
a consultation may result in an unfavorable biological opinion. 2 2
17. This provision was contained in the Energy and Water Development Appropriation
Act 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 449.
18. Furbish Lousewort Among 13 Plant Taxa Newly Listed by Service for Protection, 5
ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL. 1 (May 1978) [hereinafter cited as Furbish Lousewort I.
19. 35 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 687 (1979).
20. Telephone conversation with David Everett, Bureau of Land Management, Cedar
City, Utah (October 15, 1978).
21. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, Nos. 76-L-242, CV-78-L-90 (D.
Neb. Oct. 2, 1978).
22. 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 224 (statement of Kenneth Balcomb). The project
would also destroy the mating site of a pair of peregrine falcons, another endangered species.
The squawfish is an example of an endangered species that may already be doomed by pre-
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Water Resources Development Projects: Inundation and Depletion
In six of these eight cases, a water resource development project
was involved; the threat to endangered species was either too much
water (inundation of critical habitat) or not enough (streamflow depletion) as follows:
INUNDATION
Maramec Dam (Indiana bat)
Dickey-Lincoln Dams (Furbish lousewort)
Tellico Dam (Snail darter)
Juniper Dam (Colorado squawfish)
DEPLETION
Grayrocks Dam (Whooping crane)
Warner Valley (Woundfin)
The distinction between inundation and depletion is important for
three reasons. First, the impacts of depletion are marginal, while inundation involves a complete change of habitat (from terrestrial or
riverine to lacustrine). Compromise possibilities for inundations are
therefore more limited although they still exist. One possibility is to
operate a facility as a dry dam, which may allow the species to be
preserved and some of the economic benefits to be realized. This possibility was mentioned in connection with the Tellico case, but was
rejected as being too costly. 2 3 The only other possibility is to reduce
the size of the reservoir and destroy a part of the habitat. This was
the principal feature of a compromise settling the dispute over the
Dickey-Lincoln Dams.
A second important difference between inundation and depletion
is the predictability of the impact which development will have on
species survival. Inundation drastically alters habitat with complete
certainty. If the species is to survive, either the habitat is not critical
after all, or else it must be possible to move a self-sustaining population to another site.2 4 Neither may offer much hope for species survious alterations to its habitat. Behnke, The Impacts of Habitat Alterations on the Endangered and Threatened Fishes of the Upper Colorado River Basin, in 2 ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST: PROBLEMS OF WATER, FISH AND WILDLIFE IN THE
UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 204 (1980).
23. See Tennessee Valley Authority, Alterantives for Completing the Tellico Project 27
(report prepared in December 1978).
24. In fact, the transplant of the snail darter from the Little Tennessee to the Hiwassee
and Holston Rivers is perhaps the last hope of the species. According to Harold O'Connor of
FWS, "We are afraid that the chances of long-term survival for these populations is not
good, but we feel that it is our responsibility to do everything we can to prolong the snail
darter's existence." Tellico Dam Gets Go-Ahead, 10 ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH.
BULL. 11 (October 1979).
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vival. In contrast, the consequences of streamflow depletions are
much more uncertain. Presumably, increasingly large changes in
streamflow will cause progressively larger changes in habitat, until
eventually catastrophic change occurs. But predicting precisely the
effects of such depletions on habitat is difficult if not impossible.
Finally, with inundations conflicts between species preservation
and development are usually confined to reservoir sites, 2 s whereas
depletion affects all downstream habitats. Thus, we can expect that
conflicts involving depletions, while more resolvable, are also more
common, especially in arid regions.
Between 1973 and 1978 the Endangered Species Act appears to
have affected only a small number of projects, and only in a minority
of those did a conflict arise that could not be resolved. This suggests
that implementation of the act did not impose major barriers to economic development. However, projects that were impinged upon
were affected substantially, even if a compromise was reached. For
example, the main feature of the agreement in the Grayrocks case
was a substantial payment ($7.5 million) by the power plant consortium to purchase water rights downstream to replace the depletion
caused by the project. In addition, the Fish and Wildlife Service will
presumably regard future depletions on the upper Platte as modifications of critical habitat and attempt to stop them. If FWS is successful, Section 7 will effectively prevent further depletions from the
upper Platte.
Thus, the total costs imposed so far by implementation of Section
7 appear not to be very high, but they are distributed very unevenly.
For most people the economic impact of Section 7 has been negligible. The costs have been borne almost exclusively by the beneficiaries
of canceled, altered, or delayed projects. This distribution of costs
rather than total costs may have influenced the movement to amend
the act.
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
To understand the controversy which led to the 1978 amendments
it is useful to consider in a general way the problems of formulating
endangered species policy.
Objectives of EndangeredSpecies Protection
Why is it necessary to have an endangered species policy, and what
can it be expected to accomplish? Considerable disagreement sur25. One possible exception is that a reservoir might interrupt fish migratory patterns.
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rounds possible answers. Wild plant or animal populations are what
economists call "public goods." Because private interests are rarely
able to appropriate all the benefits obtainable from feral populations,
insufficient private incentives exist to preserve them. The resulting
failure of markets to protect endangered species provides a reason for
public intervention. Of course, the market cannot be blamed for the
entire problem of vanishing species. In the Tellico Dam case, for example, the snail darter was jeopardized by an action of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency. Nonetheless, the principle
remains the same: wildlife species have become excessively endangered
because benefits of their survival have not been counted by decisionmakers, whether public or private. The extinction of a species means
the irreversible loss of a unique biological asset; therefore, future generations have an interest not reflected in market decisions.2 6 Even if
a species provides no benefits in the present, it may in the future. To
take into account this uncertainty in the preferences of future generations, a premium must be placed on the value of the irreplaceable
2
asset. I
What are, in fact, the benefits of endangered species protection? In
the 1978 senate hearings to amend the Endangered Species Act, the
most frequently encountered justifications for a general policy of endangered species protection were first, that each species is a repository of unique general information, and second, that extinction is
irreversible.2 8 For all we know, it is argued, a species regarded today
as worthless and obscure may some day be essential to a cure for
some previously incurable disease.
This argument may be appealing, but it is limited. It is true that
exotic plants and animals provide enormous commercial and scientific benefits, especially in medicine. Nonetheless, such species form
a very small minority of all species, suggesting the probability that a
given species will some day have economic significance is equally
small. We may be able to assign higher probabilities to some species
than others, but this implies that some species are worth saving more
26. Discussions of the public good aspects of endangered species preservation are found
in Bachmura, The Economics of Vanishing Species, 11 NAT. RES. J. 674 (1971), and
Plourde, Conservation of Extinguishable Species, 15 NAT. RES. J. 791 (1975).
27. The argument for a premium placed on irreversible assets to preserve future options
was first made by Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1967).
See also J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES IN THE VALUATION OF COMMODITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES
(1975); Bishop, Endangered Species and Uncertainty: The Economics of a Safe Minimum
Standard, 60 AM. J. AG. ECON. 10 (1978).
28. See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 2, at 73, 227 (comments of Michael Bean and
Senator Kaneaster Hodges).
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than others.2 9 If such judgments are to be avoided, endangered
species protection must ultimately be based on ethical rather than
economic grounds.
More importantly, it is questionable whether the concepts of
uniqueness and irreversibility fully capture the benefits of endangered
species preservation. If preservation of genetic information were the
only benefit, other policies besides preservation of species in the wild
could be considered. Captive populations could be an acceptable policy objective, for example, as would a breakthrough in biological engineering to reproduce plants or animals from genetic information
saved in vitro. Such a genetic ark would make irreversibility irrelevant. These alternatives are at present technically infeasible, 3 0 but
even if they were not, it is unlikely that either would be universally
accepted as a solution to the problem of vanishing species. To most
people, endangered species protection means the maintenance of
populations in the wild. This is certainly true for those species noted
for their beauty or nobility, such as the bald eagle, whooping crane,
or snow leopard. Many people receive considerable satisfaction simply
knowing that these creatures are alive and well in their native habitat.
In addition, maintenance of wild populations may be important for
obscure species as well, for endangered species policy objectives may
include not only preservation of species in the wild, but preservation
of the wild itself.
The obscure species which have figured in certain recent controversies are, in particular, part and parcel of very specific environments. Their disappearance, almost invariably, signals the functional
end of the habitat in which they lived ....

Their disappearance signals

the end perhaps of free-flowing unpolluted water on a river, the end
of inland marshes in a region. It also signals the end of any bond that
they had with the land. As species they are, admittedly, insignificant,
3
but in the totality of their environment, they are something else. 1
This objective is especially relevant to a discussion of Section 7,
because it is the only section of the act explicitly concerned with
habitat. In most of the Section 7 cases mentioned earlier, preservation
of a natural environment along with survival of an endangered species
was at stake. For example, depletion of the Platte River by upstream
diversions like Grayrocks Dam posed a direct threat to the wetlands
29. Some criteria for the judgments are suggested by Ramsey, Prioritiesin Species Pro-

tection, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 595 (1976).
30. Although captive breeding is possible for many species, there are also many for
which it is not at the present time.
31. 1978 Hearings,supra note 2, at 81 (statement of Tom Garrett).
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ecosystem in the Platte River Channel.3 2 Similarly, it is said that
closing Tellico Dam would eliminate the last remaining free-flowing
stream in eastern Tennessee, and inundate archeological sites of traditional and religious significance to the Cherokee. Thus, the benefits
of Section 7 go far beyond the effects on individual endangered
species.
If ecosystem preservation is a goal of Section 7, then the range of
acceptable alternative policies would be considerably different (and
probably narrower) than if the objective were simply to preserve a
particular threatened species.
The Effectiveness of Endangered Species Policy
A policy is effective to the extent that implementation successfully
achieves its objectives. Thus, an endangered species policy is effective
to the extent that species which otherwise would have become extinct
are preserved. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to tell whether the
policy is having such an effect, for two reasons. First it will not often
be evident whether a species' long range survival prospects are improving or worsening. Even if no individuals of a species can be found
it may reflect failures of the reporting system rather than failures of
the policy. The extinction of a species therefore may not become evident until long after its occurrence. Second, the extinction or prosperity of a species may occur for reasons having little to do with
policy.
Given such uncertainties about the ultimate outcomes of policy, it
is natural to measure success with respect to intermediate or instrumental outcomes. Thus, FWS maintains a count of listed species and
critical habitat designations, the "Box Score," which appears each
month in the Endangered Species Technical Bulletin on the assumption that listed species are better protected than unlisted ones. Section 7 was designed to achieve another intermediate objective: the
preservation of natural habitat. But it must be remembered that there
is no guarantee that restrictions on development will preserve habitat,
or that habitat preservation will save the species in question.
As noted in the preceding discussion, Section 7 can also be regarded
as a device for wilderness preservation, and its effectiveness in this
32. In the last century the average annual flow in the Platte River at North Platte, Nebraska has decreased from about 2,600,000 acre feet to about 400,000 acre feet. It is believed
that this decline has caused an 85 percent reduction in the width of the channel above Lexington, Nebraska and a 60 percent reduction between Lexington and Grand Island. G. WILLIAMS, THE CASE OF THE SHRINKING CHANNELS: THE NORTH PLATTE AND
PLATTE RIVERS IN NEBRASKA (U.S. Geological Survey Circular 781, 1978).
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context may be easier to assess. Its use for this purpose is limited to
those cases where a listed species, and preferably, a critical habitat,
has been designated. Therefore, this section is probably not as widely
applicable as legislation designed specifically to protect wilderness
areas. However, the areas to which it can be applied are likely to be
especially desirable for wilderness preservation; the presence of a
unique species often indicates the existence of some unique attribute
or combination of attributes in an area.
Endangered Species Protectionand Efficiency
Section 7 was effective (in the limited sense used above) because it
subordinated all other objectives to the cause of endangered species
protection. But this same feature exposed the act to charges of economic inefficiency. Because public policy requires objectives other
than preservation of endangered species, decisions must be made regarding how to allocate society's limited resources to each objective.
Ideally, tradeoffs among competing objectives enter social decisionmaking in the budgetary process. In practice, these tradeoffs will be
very rough, inasmuch as one rarely knows with precision the relationship between money allocated and effectiveness (program outputs).
However, this rough budgetary balancing process is not possible for
agencies with significant regulatory responsibility, because the costs
of their regulations are not borne by them but by those who are
regulated.
Thus, efficiency seems to require that an agency charged with protecting endangered species must weigh the benefits of such protection
against the costs. But how are such tradeoffs to be made? Calculation
of the economic benefits from a species is simply impossible at present, and no foreseeable advances in methodology or data development
are likely to change this situation. Important nonquantifiable values
must be considered in deciding whether to take action on behalf of
an endangered species. Thus formal benefit-cost analysis is not a very
helpful tool for endangered species cases.
However, the inappropriateness of benefit-cost analysis does not
mean that efficiency is an irrelevant concept for endangered species
protection policy. For one thing, the choice is rarely mutually exclusive (either this project or that endangered species, but not both).
More commonly, the development in question will destroy only some
individuals or subpopulations of the species, or is uncertain as to its
impact on any individual. In either case, the probability that the project will lead to extinction is greater than zero but less than one.
In fact, the central issue of endangered species policy is not
whether projects that will eradicate a species will be allowed, but the
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extent to which activities will be controlled to reduce the risk faced
by endangered species. Every endangered species presumably faces a
risk of extinction (otherwise it would not be considered endangered).
Actions to protect endangered species, including regulations to protect habitat, will reduce these risks. However, to reduce the risks altogether would require the regulation of activities having only a remote connection to endangered species, and regulation of such scope
would probably be prohibitively costly. Thus, there must be some
level of risk that is acceptable.
Under the 1973 act, the Fish and Wildlife Service was exclusively
concerned with effectiveness, and therefore wrote regulations showing a strong aversion to risk. Economic considerations entered only
through pressure from outside the agency.
This aversion to risk is illustrated by the regulatory activities connected with the whooping crane migratory habitat on the Platte River
in central Nebraska. Critical habitat proposed in 19751 a included an
area of 2,600 square miles, much of which had not had a confirmed
whooper sighting in many years. After strenuous citizen protests, the
critical habitat finally promulgated in 1978 was a three-mile wide
strip containing the Platte River, with a total area less than one-tenth
that of the proposed critical habitat 4 Even along the Platte, suitable
crane habitat shrunk by over 50 percent between 1938 and 1976, a
period during which the whooping crane population nearly quadrupled,'3 suggesting that perhaps the loss of habitat was not that critical after all.
The Service's stance toward risk was also evident in the biological
opinion that Grayrocks Dam would adversely affect critical habitat
downstream. It was estimated that the power plant and dam would
reduce the annual flow in the critical habitat by no more than three
percent. Although the historical evidence suggested that previous flow
reductions had resulted in a decline in the area of suitable habitat,
there was no evidence that such reductions had had harmful effects
on the whooping cranes. Even so, it seems likely, if not inevitable,
that at some point the further loss of habitat would affect the cranes.
The effects of shrinking habitat could even be catastrophic if the
chances of an outbreak of disease were increased. The problem was
how to determine the point at which further development of the
Platte would be harmful. Faced with planned future depletions on the
Platte totaling over 40 percent of present annual flow, some of which
33. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,308 (1975).
34. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,938 (1978).
35. Office of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Preliminary Draft Recovery Plan for the Whooping Crane (December 1977).
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might be beyond the jurisdiction3 of the Endangered Species Act, FWS
took a very conservative stance. 6
The existence of risk, rather than certain extinction, also raises the
possibility that other approaches may be substituted for regulation.
Such approaches fall under the general heading of wildlife management, but in fact are so varied as not to be easily categorized. For example, whooping crane eggs can be transplanted into the nests of
sandhill cranes, which then act as foster parents for the intruders. Another practice is to warn hunters by radio whenever whoopers in the
vicinity take to the air so that they will not be shot by mistake. Still
another technique being considered is the mechanical enhancement
of habitat along the Platte River in Nebraska (on the cranes' annual
migration route).' I
Many wildlife management techniques show promise in enhancing
survival prospects of endangered species, but the question here is
whether they can be expected to act as substitutes for regulation
(that is, whether more development can be compensated for by more
wildlife management when it is economically advantageous to do so).
The use of wildlife management in this context is decidedly less
promising. For one thing, the use of many such management alternatives may not be consistent with the habitat conservation objectives
of endangered species policy as discussed above. In addition, effective
wildlife management requires considerable knowledge about the behavior and habitat requirements of the species to be protected. For
abundant species, the needed information is either known or can be
collected through experiments with management techniques. Often,
however, very little is known about the habits of endangered or rare
species, and predicting responses of such species to management techniques is problematical. That is, wildlife management may be more
appropriate to supplement the control of development rather than to
replace it.
EndangeredSpecies Protectionand Equity
Efficiency is only concerned with the total costs and benefits of a
course of action, but the fair distribution of these costs and benefits
is an equally important criterion. Obviously, a regulation that causes
a development project to be altered or canceled to avoid impacts on
36. Harrington, The Endangered Species Act and Water Resource Development 31 (report prepared for the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 1980).
37. Preliminary Draft Recovery Plan for the Whooping Crane, supra note 35. The cranes
require open sandbars in the river free of vegetation. The vegetation is naturally controlled
by scouring during floods, and "mechanical enhancement" refers to the mechanical removal
of such vegetation.
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endangered species or critical habitat imposes costs in opportunities
foregone. Less obvious, but no less real, are the costs imposed on a
landowner by a critical habitat designation in the form of increased
uncertainty regarding future regulation. Who should bear these costs?
The implicit answer given by Section 7 is that they should be borne
by the developer and those who would otherwise have benefited from
the development. This particular distribution of the costs of endangered species protection may be inevitable. In theory, of course, the
government could compensate the developer for changes necessary to
reduce the risk to the species, up to and including purchase of the
habitat for preservation. Under an efficiency criterion, one would be
indifferent to these alternatives, because total costs and benefits are
the same. The choice is also ambiguous with respect to what is fair,
because conflicting ethical principles are involved. A "polluter-pay"
principle would impose the costs on the developer. In so doing, however, one of the canons of equity used in public finance, willingness
to pay, would be violated. The willingness to pay criterion suggests
that the cost of endangered species protection should be borne by
the public at large, or perhaps by environmentalists with an especially
strong interest in endangered species protection.
Nonetheless, the practical problems associated with compensating
losers in endangered species cases are enormous. For on thing, perverse incentives would be created if the government had to compensate developers for projects halted or amended to prevent damage to
endangered species. Developers would have an interest in claiming to
build such projects even if they had no real interest in doing so. More
importantly, the government is often the developer. Most of the cases
discussed above, in fact, were partially or completely financed with
federal money. Completion of these projects implies a transfer of
funds from the nation to the region in which the development takes
place. The beneficiaries of such projects are local inhabitants who enjoy cheaper electric power, increased water supplies, and flood control. To make them indifferent to the cancellation of such a project
would mean identifying the beneficiaries and valuing the benefits
each receives. Because many of the benefits are nonmarket goods and
because their distribution is likely to be diffuse in the region, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to compensate for the cancellation of
a project.
Since compensating losers is so impractical, a regulatory strategy
was adopted for protecting species habitat, letting costs fall rather
haphazardly on those developers unlucky enough to choose areas
where endangered species live. Section 7 is thus a policy that imposes
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. This kind of policy is rarely
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implemented.3 8 Perhaps it was in this instance because the losers had
not been identified at the time the 1973 act was passed. During the
next five years, as the impacts of the act were keenly felt, pressure
began to build to
amend the act. The result was the 1978 amend39
ments to the act.
THE 1978 AMENDMENTS TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In part, the 1978 amendments give formal congressional approval
to regulations and practices previously established by the Fish and
Wildlife Service. The act requires the preparation and implementation
of recovery plans for conserving listed species. In fact, the Fish and
Wildlife Service had already been preparing such plans for a number
of years, and at the time of enactment, 18 plans had been completed
and 64 recovery teams were preparing others. Similarly, the process
outlined in the act for interagency consultation in Section 7(a-d) is
essentially the same as FWS regulations promulgated on January 4,
1978.40
Each federal agency is required to request from the Secretary of
Interior information on whether endangered species may be present
in the region to be affected by a project. If the Secretary advises that
such a possibility exists, the agency must complete within 180 days a
biological assessment to identify endangered species that may be
present. If a project could affect an endangered species, the Secretary
must submit within 90 days a biological opinion stating whether in
his or her view the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat. In addition, the Secretary must suggest modifications to the project that will remove these effects. Neither the agency nor its licensee
may make any irreversible commitment of resources that would foreclose such modifications during the consultation process. Further, if
the biological opinion concludes that the action will adversely affect
the species or its habitat, the project must be altered in accordance
with the opinion, or an exemption must be secured. "By explicitly
stating that a project cannot proceed in defiance of an unfavorable
biological opinion, the amendments remove one source of ambiguity
in the 1973 act.
But the amendments also include some noteworthy changes that
bring flexibility to the act and allow incorporation of other considerations under certain circumstances. The impetus for these changes
was TVA v. Hill. It was felt by many congressmen that the Court's
38. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT (J. McKie ed. 1974).
39. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751.
40. 43 Fed. Reg. 870 (1978).
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absolute interpretation of Section 7 was not what they had intended,
so the act was amended to allow tradeoffs among competing objectives. Congress ensured, however, that such tradeoffs would not be
made lightly.
To balance endangered species protection against other considerations the amendments established a process by which a project may
be exempted from the requirements of the act. To rule on exemptions, a seven-member Endangered Species Committee was established, consisting of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the
Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary
of Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one member from the state or states
affected by the action under consideration.
The exemption process works in the following way. If the biological opinion concludes that a federal action could "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or destroy
or adversely modify the critical habitat," any of the principals (the
federal agency, the governor of the state in which the project is to
have taken place, or the licensee) may apply to the Secretary of Interior for an exemption. Thereupon, a three-member review board is
appointed to consider the application. After determining that an irresolvable conflict does, in fact, exist and that the exemption applicant
has carried out the consultation responsibilities in good faith, the review board prepares a report on the application for the Endangered
Species Committee. Although not required, the review board may
(and probably will) conduct one or more adjudicatory hearings. Upon
receiving the review board's report, the committee may grant the exemption (possibly conditioned on the performance of certain enhancement measures) if five of its members so vote. Any outcome of
the exemption process may be reviewed in the court of appeals.
Nonetheless, the exemption process could be less important than
it seems. In the first place, Congress apparently envisioned that few
exemptions would be considered, and fewer granted. The Endangered
Species Committee is composed of seven high-ranking officials-presumably busy people with little time to be routinely involved with
the endangered species committee.
Moreover, the entire exemption process could cause significant delays, even though Congress did place time limits on each step. The
time limits given in the amendments could take up to nine months
from inception of a project to the rendering of the biological opinion.
If an exemption is applied for, it will take an additional year. Thus,
almost two years must pass before an irreversible commitment of re-
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sources can be made. This means that little work can be done on the
project until after the endangered species problem is resolved.
The actual delay could be even greater than these 21 months. First,
of course, is the possibility of judicial review. Second, there is no
sanction for missing a deadline. Many deadlines in other federal legislation are routinely missed by operating agencies.' 1 Third, the applicant is financially responsible for the mitigation or enhancement
measures that the committee may require. As a result, the committee
must have assurances that the funds are available and that such measures will be completed before the exemption can be granted. For
federal agencies with development responsibility, this means that the
funds for mitigation and enhancement measures must be authorized
and appropriated by Congress.
Changes concerning the listing of species made in the amendments
are possibly of greater significance than the exemption process. Where
practicable, a critical habitat now must be designated at the same
time a new species is listed. This designation obviously is not practicable for foreign species, but Congress clearly intended the great
majority of domestic species to be included. The failure to designate
critical habitat must be justified when the regulation is proposed.
Second, in designating critical habitat, FWS must consider economic
impact, and must apply a benefit-cost test to any area unless it is
determined that its exclusion from critical habitat will result in the
extinction of the species. Third, the amendments limit to two years
the time between proposal and promulgation of a regulation to list a
new species. If no regulation is promulgated within this period, the
proposal must be withdrawn and cannot be reproposed unless new
information becomes available. Fourth, the status of each listed
species is to be reviewed every five years. Finally, the listing process
itself was changed in important ways. The Secretary must give notice
and hold hearings in or near potential critical habitats of proposed
listings, and at the time of the proposal FWS must specify those activities that would adversely affect the habitat and therefore would
face prohibition after the listing and habitat designation. New listing
requirements will probably reduce significantly the rate at which new
species are added to the list. Indeed, every change mentioned above
works in this direction. It is impossible to say exactly how much the
rate will decline, but an upper limit is the rate at which critical habitats are designated. If economic impact and local participation re41. See, e.g., Magat, Gianessi & Harrington, Environmental Regulation in Theory and
Practice: EPA's Process of Setting Best Practicable Control Technology Standards (report
prepared for National Technical Information Service, October 1978).
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quirements play an important role, the actual rate may be considerably less than it has been.
One can make a good argument that these changes will have little
effect on development projects. After all, nearly 200 species are already on the list. Besides, species that are not on the list may be proposed for inclusion in relatively short order. Though a biological
assessment is required only in those areas where listed or proposed
species are suspected to be present, a routine EIS may turn up specimens of a previously unsuspected endangered species-as indeed happened with the Furbish lousewort. Although it is true that the listing
process will be more difficult in the future, FWS would naturally tend
to commit its resources to the species that face the most dangerthose species about to be "developed" into oblivion.
But there are other considerations that outweigh these. First, it
should be noted that although 200 U.S. species have been listed, only
34 critical habitats have been designated. The economic impact requirement will make critical habitat designation and new species listing more difficult and allow for more local participation. As a result,
FWS is likely to find that in this environment it can no longer afford
to be so risk-averse in endangered species protection. Second, the two
year limit from proposal to final promulgation means that FWS will
have to be much more careful about the species it proposes. (At the
time of enactment of the 1978 amendments, about 1800 species
were proposed for listing; these proposals are now being reviewed.)
Experience with other agencies suggests that informal rulemaking procedures often take more than two years to complete.4 2 Third, and
probably most important, with the new requirements it will take
considerably more agency resources to produce one listing, but the
authorized appropriations have not expanded to take into account
the increased load.
The Pittston Refinery: Request for an Exemption
The very limited experience since passage of the 1978 amendments
tends to support these preceding assertions. Except for the Tellico
and Grayrocks Dams, whose consideration by the Endangered Species
Committee was mandatory, only one exemption has been sought: the
Pittston Refinery in Eastport, Maine. This refinery is subject to the
Endangered Species Act because it must obtain an effluent discharge
permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In December 1978, FWS issued a biological opinion that completion of the
42. Id.
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project would jeopardize the continued existence of the bald eagle in
Maine. EPA accordingly denied the permit. After Pittston applied for
an exemption in January 1979, all parties agreed to a 90-day suspension of the exemption process so that another consultation, in search
of a compromise, could take place. In May, however, FWS reaffirmed
its earlier conclusion, and the review board resumed its processing of
the exemption application. Several environmental groups immediately
sued to halt the proceedings, claiming that EPA's internal appeals
procedure had not been exhausted. Thus Pittston, which had first
applied to EPA for a permit in early 1978, still must go through an
EPA appeals procedure lasting several months before further action
can be taken on its exemption application. This experience is not
likely to make developers particularly eager to seek exemptions from
the Endangered Species Committee.
FWS also may be anxious to avoid an irresolvable conflict requiring
the Endangered Species Committee to convene, because such conflict
might lead to the reopening of the issue of endangered species protection in Congress. If the mood of Congress is shifting away from support of environmental protection in favor of economic (and especially
energy) development, it is probably not a good time (from the point
of view of FWS) for reconsideration of endangered species policy.
The new listing procedures have resulted, through July 1979, in
only three new species being added to the endangered species list, and
in no new designations of critical habitats. This result allowed FWS
to avoid the public hearing and economic impact requirements stipulated by the amendments. Critical habitats were not designated on
the grounds that restricting information on the location of the species
would protect the species from being taken. That this is no idle concern is evidenced by the experience with the Virginia roundleaf birch,
thought to be extinct since 1914, but recently rediscovered I Shortly
after its listing as an endangered species, several trees were stolen and
others damaged. Even so, one must wonder what kind of protection
can be offered to species whose location cannot even be revealed.
CONCLUSIONS
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, designed to protect "critical habitat" of endangered species was effective policy for
two reasons. First, it gave preservation of species in a local setting
overriding importance. Second, the listing of new species and critical
habitat designations was administratively simple enough to allow en43. Furbish Lousewort, supra note 18, at 7.
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dangered, but as yet unlisted, species to be nearly as protected from
the consequences of development as were previously listed species.
At the same time the act threatened to have a large potential impact on economic development projects, especially water resource
projects. A quick survey of the experience with Section 7 suggests,
however, that the actual impact was relatively minor, although a small
number of important and highly visible cases were affected. To be
sure, casual evidence of this sort can be misleading. On the one hand,
it is unknown how many projects were altered, delayed, or abandoned in the planning stages as a result of uncertainties regarding the
implementation of the Section 7. On the other hand, projects were
affected by many regulations besides the Endangered Species Act. A
proposed development challenged by Section 7 is likely to be also
affected by NEPA, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, designation of
wilderness areas, or regulations to prevent significant deterioration of
air quality, as well as many other regulations. In such cases, to attribute all the costs of regulation to the 1973 Endangered Species Act is
obviously misleading.
When the Endangered Species Act was enacted in 1973, potential
costs were not an issue. It was only after these costs became evident
that the act was amended in 1978. However, little evidence exists to
suggest that Congress was motivated by a concern for economic efficiency. Rather it appears Congress was concerned with the distribution of the costs.
The Tellico exemption demonstrates Congress' motivation. With
no consideration of the value of the snail darter, a cost-benefit analysis of the Tellico project by the Office of Policy Analysis in the Department of Interior showed that the net benefits of a "river development" alternative almost equaled those of a "reservoir" alternative. 4
Thereupon the Endangered Species Committee, which had been considering Tellico for an exemption to Section 7, denied the exemption
because a reasonable alternative existed. Not long after that, however, Congress exempted Tellico from the requirements of the act,
and directed TVA to complete the project.4 5
The most common means of adjusting for distributional effects is
through compensation, but, as noted above, compensation does not
seem to be an appropriate solution here. Rather, the apparent strategy of Congress was to restrain the effects of the Endangered Species
44. Office of Policy Analysis, Department of Interior, Tellico Dam and Reservoir (report prepared for the Endangered Species Committee, January 1979).
45. See Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93

Stat. 449.
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Act through procedural means: by providing an appeals process for
hard cases and making it more difficult to list species and designate
critical habitat. Because such changes do not pinpoint the real conflict, which is the localized costs of habitat conservation, further adjustment of the act can be expected. The Tellico exemption may
only be the beginning.

